

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01     SANTIA 12205 01 OF 02 301515Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----301519Z 033008 /41

P R 301418Z DEC 76  
FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2793  
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA  
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA  
AMEMBASSY CARACAS  
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ  
AMEMBASSY LIMA  
AMEMBASSY QUITO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SANTIAGO 12205

EXDIS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHLAUDEMAN FROM POPPER

EO 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, MILI, PE, PN, EC, CI, BL  
SUBJECT: SOME THOUGHTS ON DISCOURAGING HOSTILITIES BETWEEN  
PERU AND ITS NEIGHBORS

REFS: (A) STATE 310852, AND REPLIES THERETO

1. SUMMARY: RECENT ALARUMS WITH RESPECT TO ALLEGED MILITARY  
MOVEMENTS INVOLVING PERU AND ITS NEIGHBORS SEEM LIKELY TO  
STIMULATE RENEWED CONSIDERATION OF WHAT WE AND OTHERS MIGHT DO,  
IN THE LONGER PERIOD AHEAD, TO DISCOURAGE RESORT TO HOSTILITIES  
BY ANY PARTY. AS MATTERS STAND TODAY, INSTABILITY IS ENHANCED  
BY: THE DIFFICULTY OF CHECKING OUT SENSATIONAL REPORTS OF  
MILITARY MOVEMENTS; THE PERSISTENCE OF IRREDENTISM AROUND PERU'S  
BORDERS; THE PREDOMINANCE OF PERU IN MILITARY MATERIEL; THE  
BEARING OF HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES ON WHAT ARE PERCEIVED TO BE U.S.  
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED; AND THE DIFFICULTY  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02     SANTIA 12205 01 OF 02 301515Z

OF EMPLOYING MULTILATERAL MEASURES TO DISCOURAGE HOSTILITIES  
AS A RESULT OF AGGRESSION, MISCALCULATION OR ACCIDENT. THIS  
MESSAGE CONTAINS CERTAIN THOUGHTS FOR EXPLORATION IN COPING  
WITH EACH OF THESE FACTORS. END SUMMARY.

2. AS AN EMBASSY INTIMATELY CONCERNED WITH MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

INVOLVING PERU, WE HAVE FOLLOWED WITH INTEREST LAST WEEKEND'S EXCHANGES ON ALLEGED PREPARATIONS FOR HOSTILITIES IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS OR WEEKS. FROM WHERE WE SIT, AND BASED ON THE INFORMATION WE HAVE, WE ARE NOT PERSUADED THAT THE CURRENT SITUATION CALLS FOR DRASTIC MEASURES SUCH AS SHARP PUBLIC STATEMENTS OR UNILATERAL USG MEASURES OF CONSTRAINT. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT AT SOME STAGE THE U.S. MIGHT WISH TO GO TO THE PERUVIANS WITH A DIRECT WARNING, BUT THIS WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO BE A CRISIS MANAGEMENT MEASURE. MEANWHILE, WE BELIEVE THAT TENSIONS IN THE AREA ARE LIKELY TO INCREASE IN THE MONTHS AND YEARS AHEAD. THE START OF A NEW ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE A PROPITIOUS TIME FOR REVIEWING OLD CONTINGENCY PLANS AND REASSESSING PROPOSALS FOR CONTAINING AN AREA PROBLEM WHICH WILL NOT DISAPPEAR. FOLLOWING ARE SOME IDEAS WHICH I THINK COULD BE USEFUL IN THIS CONTEXT.

3. ASSESSING SENSATIONAL REPORTS: THIS IS AN ENDEMIC PROBLEM, INTENSIFIED BECAUSE WE ARE DEALING WITH HIGHLY EMOTIONAL PERSONALITIES AND REPORTS CONCERNING REMOTE REGIONS NOT ORDINARILY SUBJECT TO DIRECT OBSERVATION. OUR SOPHISTICATED INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION PROCEDURES IN THE AREA SUCH AS SATELLITE OBSERVATION AND COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE MAY REQUIRE UPGRADING, TO KEEP PACE WITH RISING TENSIONS. WE MIGHT ALSO WISH TO ASSIST THE STATES DIRECTLY CONCERNED TO ACQUIRE THE NECESSARY MEANS FOR COLLECTING INFORMATION ABOUT CONDITIONS NEAR THEIR BORDERS.

4. IN ADDITION, IF CONDITIONS WARRANT, WE OUGHT TO INTRODUCE INTO THE PICTURE THE ELEMENT OF FACT-FINDING AS A MEANS OF MUTUAL REASSURANCE. THE HIGHLY NATIONALISTIC COUNTRIES CONCERNED

SECRET

PAGE 03     SANTIA 12205 01 OF 02 301515Z

MIGHT NOT LIKE IT -- THEY PRESUMABLY WOULD NOT ACCEPT IT AS A PERMANENT MEASURE -- BUT THEY OUGHT TO BE AWARE THAT REFUSAL TO PERMIT A FACT-FINDING MISSION TO VISIT AREAS OF TENSION AT CRITICAL MOMENTS WOULD INVOLVE A CERTAIN POLITICAL COST. IT IS NOT TOO SOON TO BEGIN THINKING ABOUT HOW THE OAS -- WHICH PERFORMED SUCH A MISSION IN THE BELIZE-GUATEMALA AND EL SALVADOR-HONDURAS CASES -- MIGHT BE ENGAGED. AS A COROLLARY, STATES IN THE REGION MIGHT BE ASKED TO AGREE TO SUPPLY THEIR NEIGHBORS WITH INFORMATION REGARDING MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS AND MANEUVERS.

5. SECURITNG UNEASY FRONTIERS: GIVEN THE DEEP-ROOTED IRREDENTIST SENTIMENT IN PERU, ECUADOR AND BOLIVIA, CROSS-BORDER INCURSIONS AND SUBSEQUENT HOSTILITIES ARE A CONSTANT POSSIBILITY. IT WOULD SEEM WORTHWHILE TO CONCERN OURSELVES WITH THE BUILDING OF POLITICAL BARRIERS AGAINST SUCH DEVELOPMENTS. AT LEAST AS REGARDS PERU, CHILE AND BOLIVIA, A TREATY STRUCTURE EXISTS WHICH LEGITIMIZES PRESENT FRONTIERS. BUT ADDITIONAL IMPEDIMENTS

WOULD BE USEFUL IN RESTRAINING PRESSURES FOR TERRITORIAL CHANGE. IT MAY BE TOO MUCH TO EXPECT THAT MOST OF THE STATES INVOLVED WOULD TODAY BE WILLING TO AFFIRM THE INVOLABILITY OF PRESENT FRONTIERS. BUT AT SOME MOMENT OF HEIGHTENED TENSION, CONCERNED INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS COULD PLAUSIBLY DEMAND THAT THE STATES INVOLVED AGREE TO RESPECT THE PRESENT BORDERS. A NON-AGGRESSION PACT, AND AGREEMENTS NOT TO BE THE FIRST TO ATTACK FOREIGN FORCES MIGHT ALSO BE EXPLORED. (THERE WOULD PRESUMABLY HAVE TO BE A HELSINKI-TYPE FORMULA TO PERMIT TERRITORIAL CHANGES BY AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED, SO AS NOT TO PRECLUDE A BOLIVIAN CORRIDOR SETTLEMENT.)

6. DEALING WITH THE ARMS IMBALANCE: THE ORDER OF MAGNITUDE PREDOMINANCE OF PERUVIAN MILITARY MATERIEL IS OBVIOUSLY ONE OF THE MOST DESTABILIZING AND INTRACTABLE ELEMENTS IN THE SITUATION. NO ONE COUNTRY, CERTAINLY NOT THE U.S., CAN SOLVE IT ALONE. IT IS WORTH CONSIDERING WHETHER THE TIME HAS COME TO SEEK A SOLUTION THROUGH MULTILATERAL MEANS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04     SANTIA 12205 01 OF 02 301515Z

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE 01     SANTIA 12205 02 OF 02 301524Z  
ACTION SS-25

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P R 301418Z DEC 76  
FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2794  
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SANTIAGO 12205

EXDIS

7. TWO APPROACHES ARE POSSIBLE: AN AGREEMENT AMONG ARMS SUPPLIERS TO LIMIT SALES TO THE SUB-REGIONAL COUNTRIES CONCERNED, OR AGREEMENT AMONG THOSE COUNTRIES TO RESTRICT THEIR FUTURE ARMS ACQUISITIONS. AS TO THE FORMER -- AGREEMENTS BY SUPPLIERS -- WE RECALL MUCH TALK BUT LITTLE EFFECTIVE ACTION ON WORLD-WIDE CONTROLS, IN UN AND OTHER MULTILATERAL CIRCLES; AND IT IS DIFFICULT TO ENVISAGE AGREEMENTS INVOLVING THE SOVIET BLOC EXCEPT AS PART OF A MORE GENERAL SYSTEM OF ARMS EXPORT CONTROLS WHICH DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE IMMINENT.

8. THERE MIGHT BE A GREATER PROSPECT OF AGREEMENT AMONG PERU, CHILE, ECUADOR AND BOLIVIA TO LIMIT ARMS PURCHASES IN THE GENERAL INTEREST. THE GENERAL IDEA HAS ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED AMONG THEM. AS A FIRST STEP THEY MIGHT BE ASKED TO AGREE NOT TO ACQUIRE SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT NOT YET INCORPORATED IN THEIR FORCES, SUCH AS LONGER RANGE MISSILES AND ATTACK CARRIERS. THE PROBLEM WE SEE IN THIS AREA IS THAT WHILE THE PERUVIANS, GIVEN THEIR CURRENT SUBSTANTIAL LEAD, MIGHT BE WILLING TO PUT UP THE BARS AT AN EARLY STAGE, THE CHILEANS WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO AGREE

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PAGE 02     SANTIA 12205 02 OF 02 301524Z

THAT THE CURRENT RATIOS SHOULD BE FROZEN INDEFINITELY UNLESS AN AGREEMENT INCLUDES STEPS TO BALANCE THEIR FORCES AND PERU'S.

9. AS AN ELEMENT IN ARMS LIMITATION NEGOTIATIONS, WE MIGHT WISH TO EXPLORE WAYS OF NEUTRALIZING THE EXISTING IMBALANCE. FOR EXAMPLE, SINCE SOVIET-BUILT TANKS IN PERU SEEM A MAJOR THREAT TO THE CHILEANS, IT MAY BE DESIRABLE TO PERMIT THE GOC TO ACQUIRE ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, AS PART OF AN AGREEMENT. LOGICALLY, ALL OTHER AREA COUNTRIES SHOULD BE GIVEN THE SAME OPPORTUNITY.

10. THE HUMAN RIGHTS FACTOR: WE HAVE NOTED WITH SOME CONCERN RECENT REFERENCES BY SOME FOREIGN OFFICIALS TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT MIGHT CONDONE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST CHILE BECAUSE OF THE LATTER'S HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT A U.S. ADMINISTRATION WOULD EMBRACE SUCH A VIEW. IT IS IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, THAT PERUVIANS AND ECUADORIANS NOT BE DELUDED INTO THINKING THAT IT MIGHT. IF THE CHILEANS WERE TO SUFFER MILITARY OR POLITICAL HUMILIATION BECAUSE OF SUCH A U.S. BIAS, THE INTERNAL RESULTS IN CHILE WOULD SURELY BE EXPLOSIVE -- BUT NOT IN THE SENSE OF CREATING A POLITICAL SYSTEM SYMPATHETIC TO US. MOREOVER, THERE SEEMS TO US TO BE SOME SUBSTANCE IN THE CHILEAN WARNING THAT AS MATTERS NOW STAND, FAVORITISM TO PERU COULD INVOLVE A MASSIVE INCREASE IN SOVIET AND CUBAN INFLUENCE IN SOUTH AMERICA. THE U.S. POSITION SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR.

11. PARTICIPATION IN MULTILATERAL MEASURES: THE TYPE OF SITUATION WHICH IS BREWING IN THIS REGION COULD BE A PARADIGM

CASE FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION, BY THE OAS OR CONCEIVABLY THE UN. CERTAINLY THIS WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO UNILATERAL U.S. ACTION, WITH ALL ITS POTENTIAL FOR CREATING ANIMOSITIES, AND IT MIGHT NOT BE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT THAN ACTION BY A SELECTED GROUP OF HEMISPHERE POWERS. WE ARE AWARE OF THE COMPLEXITIES OF OBTAINING OAS COOPERATION IN MATTERS OF THIS KIND, PARTICULARLY BEFORE A CRISIS STAGE HAS BEEN REACHED. NEVERTHELESS,  
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PAGE 03     SANTIA 12205 02 OF 02 301524Z

IF IT HAS NOT ALREADY BEEN DONE, SOME INTERNAL CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON OUR OWN WOULD SURELY BE USEFUL, AND POSSIBLY ALSO SOME QUIET DISCUSSION WITH THIRD PARTIES PRINCIPALLY CONCERNED SUCH AS BRAZIL. IN THIS CONNECTION WE NOTE WITH INTEREST THE POSSIBILITY OF BRAZILIAN MEDIATION DISCUSSED IN BRASILIA 10578.

12. THE CORRIDOR ISSUE: WHILE THE DISCUSSION OF THE VARIOUS BOLIVIAN CORRIDOR PROPOSALS HAS THUS FAR BEEN HELD TO POLITE DIPLOMATIC LEVELS, THE TEMPERATURE OF THE DISCOURSE MAY WELL RISE IN THE FUTURE. AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY THAT THIS MIGHT HAPPEN, WE WONDER IF THERE SHOULD NOT BE SOME EXPLORATION OF THE QUESTION WHETHER THIRD-PARTY RECOMMENDATIONS MIGHT BE USEFUL. THE AGENCY CONCERNED MIGHT BE AN OAS OR A UN AD HOC COMMITTEE, OR A GROUP OF "WISE MEN" SELECTED FOR THEIR LEGAL COMPETENCE, DIPLOMATIC SKILL, AND IMPARTIALITY. THE MOMENT HAS NOT YET ARRIVED FOR A FORMAL PROPOSAL, BUT IF THE NEGOTIATIONS BECOME MORE STRIDENT, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE ONE.

13. WE HAVE NO ILLUSIONS AS TO THE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN EFFECTUATING MEASURES OF THE KIND DISCUSSED ABOVE. BUT IT IS NOT TOO SOON TO PONDER THE MIX OF PROPOSALS WE WOULD NEED TO MAKE IF THE SITUATION CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE.  
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## Message Attributes

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